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THE ILLUSION OF THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION IN
DEFAMATION LAW*
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a
human soul."
-Mark Twain
JOHN LOCKE STATED in An Essay Concerning Human Un-
derstanding that "[w]e should have a great many fewer disputes
in the world if words were taken for what they are, the signs of
our ideas only, and not for things themselves." 1 Yet, words do
cause disputes, and they often injure people. Because of this po-
tential for harm, states have attempted to protect their citizens
through the law of defamation.2 At the same time, the Constitu-
tion guarantees that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." 3 Thus, there is a conflict
between an individual's right to have his reputation protected and
the right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.4
One dispute arising out of this conflict results from the belief
that newspapers are privileged to print opinions but may be sued
for printing false statements of fact. This belief stems from dicta
* The author thanks Professor Jonathan Entin of the Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity School of Law for his helpful and thought-provoking comments.
I. E. OBOLER, THE FEAR OF THE WORD: CENSORSHIP AND SEX 20 (1974).
2. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)(Stewart, J., concurring). "The protec-
tion of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual
States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments" of the United States Constitution. Id. at
92. The ninth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." US. CONsT. amend. IX.
3. US. CONST. amend. I.
4. Although many of the arguments used in this Note apply to various forms of
speech and written information, the focus of this Note is on information conveyed by the
media. However, it is plausible that there should be be no difference between the treatment
of the media and other forms of speech. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), five of the Justices maintained that there should be no such
difference.
For our purposes, this Note assumes there is a difference, whether it is significant or
not, and focuses on the media aspect. One possible difference is the belief that people are
more likely to believe information they receive through the media rather than what the
man on the street says. Furthermore, this Note largely focuses on libel, as opposed to slan-
der, because most of the cases discussed involve the written word. The analysis, however,
could apply to all types of defamation.
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in the 1974 Supreme Court case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor
the careless error materially advances society's interest in "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.'
A number of states and federal courts have interpreted Gertz as
creating a privilege for opinions.6
5. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
6. McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (Ist Cir. 1987)(holding that a reporter's
article, implicitly concluding that an encounter with condominium salespeople was a scam,
was a constitutionally protected opinion); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302
(8th Cir.)(reh'g en banc)(the former State Attorney General claimed that a magazine arti-
cle implied he was prosecuting a party for revenge, and the court held that the statement
was constitutionally protected opinion), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Mr. Chow of
New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1985)(statements published
in a restaurant guide were constitutionally protected statements of opinion); Redco Corp. v.
CBS, 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 1985)(in suit by manufacturer of tire rims over news
show segment about the safety of the rims, the court denied recovery by finding that the
facts disclosed were true and the program adequately disclosed the basis for the opinions
expressed); OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc)(statements
in newspaper column about political science professor held to be constitutionally protected
expressions of opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 259-60, 721 P.2d 87, 90, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209 (1986)(state-
ments in television program review held to be statements of opinion), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 890, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1360 (1987); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting, 659
P.2d 1351, 1358 (Colo. 1983)(statements in news broadcast that a wife "deserted" her
disabled husband could be seen as false statements of defamatory fact, and even if seen as
opinion, the language implied underlying defamatory facts); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 116-18, 448 A.2d 1317, 1323-24 (1982)(news-
paper articles' comments held to be constitutionally protected "pure" opinion); Riley v.
Moyed, 529 A.2d 248, 251 (Del. 1987)(newspaper article stating that a county council
member and other politicians spent more time listening to developers than to other constit-
uents was a constitutionally protected expression of pure opinion); Myers v. Plan Takoma,
Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 47 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983)(the court held that the phrase "a shady group
of bar owners" in a leaflet, distributed by a neighborhood association in an effort to block
the issuance of a liquor license to the plaintiff, was a constitutionally protected opinion);
Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 883-85 (La. 1977)(a newspaper's restaurant review
privileged as opinion when not made with knowing or reckless falsity); Caron v. Bangor
Publishing, 470 A.2d 782, 784 (Me.)(editorial which claimed that police officers should be
in good physical shape but plaintiff policeman was overweight was a statement of opinion
because the article made clear the basis for the opinion), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241
(1984); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 781-83 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)(language
that insurance agents "acted with greed" to fleece consumers were permissible expressions
of opinion); Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 410, 664 P.2d
337, 341-42 (1983)(statement that one of a gubernatorial candidate's checks for political
advertising would not clear and a remark that implied that the candidate did not pay his
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Even if one accepts the fact that there is a privilege for opin-
ions, 7 another problem arises in distinguishing fact from opinion.
Courts have created a number of tests for determining the differ-
ence between fact and opinion. Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court
selected a "totality of circumstances" test,8 but the decision was
far from unanimous. 9 Other jurisdictions have also had difficulty
political bills were actionable statements of fact); Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89
N.J. 62, 65, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1982)(statements published in a newspaper as part of a
letter to the editor claiming that the plaintiff-mayor might be taking part in a "huge
coverup" were protected expressions of opinion); Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Trib-
une Co., 98 N.M. 282, 288, 648 P.2d 321, 330 (Ct. App. 1981)(political ad which stated
that the gubernatorial candidate would be the kind of governor who would put his "cro-
nies" in state government was a constitutionally protected opinion), cert. quashed, 98 N.M.
336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 289, 501 N.E.2d 550,
552, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (Ct. App. 1986)(statements in banner and telephone messages
allegedly referring to former union member as "scab" and lacking in talent were nonac-
tionable expressions of pure opinion); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 245, 496
N.E.2d 699, 701 (1986)(statements in a sportswriter's article alleging that plaintiff com-
mitted perjury held to be nonactionable opinion); Healy v. New England Newspapers, Inc.,
520 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I. 1987)(in newspaper articles reporting opinions about a plaintiff
physician's failure to aid collapsed individual, court held that the opinions could reasonably
be understood to imply assertion of undisclosed, but false and defamatory, facts justifying
the opinions); Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 537, 716 P.2d 842, 847 (1986)(hold-
ing that a letter from a real estate partner's attorney to a savings and loan branch man-
ager's attorney, which suggested that the manager's actions amounted to solicitation of a
kickback and which the partner gave to the savings and loan officials, was a nonactionable
expression of opinion).
7. This Note will not focus on whether the Supreme Court actually meant to create a
privilege for opinion. There is an argument that the Gertz dicta has been expanded to
encompass far more than the Court intended. In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in
Ollman v. Evans, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, referred to the Gertz
dicta by stating "it is apparent . . . that lower courts have seized upon the word 'opinion'
[in Gertz] to solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question." 471 U.S. 1127,
1129 (1985). But cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988), reversing, 797
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). In Falwell, an invasion of privacy case, Chief Justice Rehnquist
writing for the majority stated, "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition
of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern." 108 S. Ct. at 879. While the Supreme Court's intent remains open
here, this Note will focus on what the Supreme Court and the lower courts should do.
Although in Falwell the Court appears to embrace some sort of opinion privilege,
many questions remain. Indeed, on its facts, Falwell may not go much beyond Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)(an obvious use of "rhetorical
hyperbole" does not subject a newspaper to liability for defamation). If opinions are privi-
leged, the Falwell Court fails to give a test for determining when a statement is an "opin-
ion." Also, the Court did not state whether Hustler Magazine would have been liable for
its advertisement parody of Jerry Falwell if the minister had been a private person. Al-
though most lower courts do not examine the status of the plaintiff in applying the opinion
privilege, the Falwell Court did emphasize that Falwell was a public figure.
8. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986).
9. The court voted 4-3 in regards to selecting the totality of circumstances test. Id.
1988-891
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selecting a test.' 0
This Note will examine the problems arising from the belief
that there is a distinction between fact and opinion. The first part
of the Note will present an overview of the current status of libel
law and the protections provided for the media by the United
States Supreme Court. These cases are important in order to ob-
tain an understanding of the reasoning behind current media pro-
tections. Part I will conclude with a summary of the primary con-
cerns of those protections.
The second part of this Note discusses a number of lower
court cases which have addressed the fact-opinion distinction, be-
ginning with an important decision from the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Olman v. Evans." Next, this Note will examine a re-
cent Ohio Supreme Court case that followed Olman in adopting
the totality of circumstances test for distinguishing fact from opin-
ion, Scott v. News-Herald.'2 Also, this Note will examine tests
used in other jurisdictions, including the Restatement test' 3 and
variations on the Olman totality of circumstances test.'4 Part III
of this Note addresses the fact-opinion distinction in light of the
constitutional concerns of freedom of the press and the need to
protect wronged individuals.
Part IV of this Note presents a solution to the problems cre-
ated by the illusion that facts and opinions are distinguishable.
The solution presented is not a fact-opinion test, but a realignment
of current protections for the media. This Note will explain where
the realignments should be made and proposes that the fact-opin-
ion tests should be abolished, either by the United States Supreme
Court or by the state courts reassessing the intent and meaning of
the Gertz dicta. Further, this Note will address arguments against
such a solution. In Part V, a summary of the proposed structure
will be presented. An analysis of the manner in which the new
structure will work will be offered, pointing out the solution's sim-
ilarity to common law protections for the media.
10. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
11. Id.
12. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
14. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir. 1980); Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986).
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I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. The Cases
Until the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan in 1964,1' libel was assumed to be beyond the scope of
first amendment protection. The common law, however, recog-
nized in defamation actions a qualified privilege of "fair com-
ment" upon the qualifications and conduct of public officers and
public employees. This privilege encompassed the publication of
matters of general public concern. State courts did not agree on
whether the privilege of public discussion was limited to opinion
and comment or whether it extended to any false assertion of
fact.17
In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court de-
fined a constitutional privilege that allowed open criticism of pub-
lic officials free from the restraints imposed by the common law of
defamation." The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held
that the first and fourteenth amendments prevent "a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 19
Justice Brennan "consider[ed] this case against the back-
ground of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. J. BARRON & C.T. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 222
(1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
17. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in
Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1962). This article is a pre-Gertz discussion
of the problems of distinguishing fact from opinion for the fair comment privilege. "The
meanings of the two words ["fact" and "opinion"] are so vague that the distinction can be
used and is used to justify any conclusion which might be reached." Id. at 1215.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282-83.
19. Id. at 279-80. The phrase "actual malice" can be confusing in this area of the
law because the words do not mean the same as in their everyday usage. In the interest of
clarity, the term "actual malice," which implies bad faith, should not be used to mean
"knowledge or reckless disregard." Black's Law Dictionary best illustrates the confusion.
"In libel and slander, as to privileged communications, 'malice' involves an evil intent or
motive arising from spite or ill will. . . . In the context of a libel suit brought by a public
figure, it consists in publishing the false defamation knowing it to be false or with a reck-
less disregard of whether it is true of false." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 492 (6th ed.
1983).
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times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials."' 20 Thus, one of the main themes of the New York Times
opinion is "the importance under the First Amendment of public
criticism of governmental action."' Another important theme is
that "a qualified constitutional privilege for the citizen-critic of
government is perceived as a necessary corollary to the privilege
protecting public officials [for statements made] in the perform-
ance of their official duties."22
The Court's opinion stated that a rule which forced a critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of his factual assertions
would lead to "self-censorship. '2 3 Such a rule "thus dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." '24 The constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of expression "'was fashioned to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.' ",25 The Court quoted Judge
Learned Hand as stating that the first amendment "'presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a mul-
titude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.
To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all.' "26
In supporting the importance of open debate, Justice Brennan
cited Barr v. Matteo,27 which held "the utterance of a federal offi-
cial to be absolutely privileged if made 'within the outer perime-
ter' of his duties." '28 His opinion also pointed out that all state
courts "hold that all officials are protected unless actual malice
can be proved."29 In a society which holds the people to be the
sovereigns, it is as much the people's "duty to criticize as it is the
official's duty to administer."30 "It would give public servants an
unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of offi-
cial conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
21. HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 224.
22. Id.
23. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
26. Id. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), affid, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
27. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
28. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 282 (quoting Barr, 360 U.S. at 575).
29. Id.
30. id.
[Vol. 39:867
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granted to the officials themselves." 31 Thus, with the public offical
privilege and the necessity of open debate in mind, the Court lim-
ited the states' ability to impose liability for defamation. 2
In 1966, the Court extended the actual malice standard to
criticism of an unelected, albeit municipally employed, ski area
supervisor.33 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,14 however, went fur-
ther. In that case, a majority of the Justices agreed that the pro-
tection created in New York Times applies to cases involving pub-
lic figures as well as public officials.3 5
Four years after Curtis Publishing, the Court went beyond
its previous approach of looking only at the status of the plaintiff
and began looking at the issue involved in the challenged state-
ment. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,36 a plurality opinion
written by Justice Brennan and joined by, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun, sought to "honor the commitment to ro-
bust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First
Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discus-
sion and communication involving matters of public or general
31. Id. at 282-83.
32. In their concurring opinion in New York Times, Justices Black and Douglas ar-
gued that, rather than merely limit it, the Court should deny altogether the states' power to
assess damages against critics of public officials. They claimed that "at the very least [the
first amendment] leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public
affairs with impunity." 376 U.S. at 296. They reasoned that to penalize the right to discuss
public affairs through libel judgments would "abridge or shut off discussion of the very
kind most needed." Id. at 297. These themes recur in later opinions by Justices Black and
Douglas. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355-60 (1974)(Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971)(Black, J., concurring);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967)(Black, J., dissenting).
This solution certainly carries the advantage of simplicity. A majority of the Court
believes, however, that even public officials are sometimes deserving of judicial redress for
criticism leveled against them. Such an approach necessitates line-drawing.
One should note that while the majority's limited privilege applies only when the
plaintiff is a public official, Justice Black would apply an absolute privilege to cases involv-
ing either a public official or an issue of public concern. For a discussion of this issue, see
infra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
33. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
34. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
35. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion concluded that the New York Times rule
should not be applied to public figures. Chief Justice Warren, however, concurring in the
result reached by the plurality, agreed with the four dissenting Justices on the issue of the
appropriate standard. The Chief Justice stated that the New York Times standard should
apply to public figures, because the difference between public figures and public officials
has "no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy." Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at
163. Warren also stressed that public opinion may be the only way for society to influence
its public figures, since public figures are not elected. Id. at 164.
36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971):
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concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are fa-
mous or anonymous. '3 7 The plurality extended actual malice pro-
tection to all communication involving public issues."8 Justice
Brennan explained, "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a pri-
vate individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual
did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."3 9
The Rosenbloom approach, however, was short lived. In
1974, three years after Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court returned
to a status-oriented approach in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.40
Gertz involved a libel suit by an attorney against the publisher of
American Opinion, a monthly magazine published by the John
Birch Society.
After recapping the Rosenbloom decision, the Gertz majority
declared a distinction, for constitutional purposes, between ideas
and facts.4 It was this dicta that the lower courts have interpreted
as creating an opinion privilege.42 The Gertz opinion, authored by
Justice Powell, revived the idea that private individuals deserve a
higher level of protection from libel than public figures.43
Gertz left some control to the states, holding that they may
define any standard of liability, except strict liability, for "defam-
atory falsehood injurious to a private individual. '44 The Court,
however, also prohibited the states from allowing recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages, even by private individuals, when the
defendant did not act with actual malice.45
In a sharp dissent, Justice Brennan clung to the Rosenbloom
rule. His dissent claimed that the court's retreat from Rosen-
bloom denied the media the extra breathing space necessary to
maintain freedom of the press.46 In another dissent, Justice White
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. See id. at 52.
39. Id. at 43.
40. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See cases cited supra note 6.
43. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46.
44. Id. at 347.
45. Id. at 349.
46. Id. at 361. In this dissent, Justice Brennan left open the possibility of one way in
which defamed individuals might at least partially regain their reputation without over-
coming the difficulty of establishing actual malice. He suggested that a legislature could
enact a statute to allow suits for retraction or for publication of a court's determination of
falsity, in which a plaintiff would have to prove falsity but not fault. Id. at 368 n.3.
This suggestion makes sense. The concerns of libel law focus on the problems that: (1)
[Vol. 39:867
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criticized the Court for giving the media too much protection.47
The issue-oriented approach, however, was reintroduced into
this area of the law in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders Inc.48 In that case, five Justices held that the first amend-
ment does not require a showing of actual malice in order to
award presumed or punitive damages when the defamatory state-
ments involve matters of private concern.49
In Greenmoss, a construction company sued a credit-report-
ing agency for circulating a false report which stated that the con-
tractor had filed for bankruptcy. The Court found for the plaintiff
and held that because the report was a matter of private concern
it deserved no special protection." Justice Powell began his analy-
sis for the plurality by stating, "we must employ the approach
approved in Gertz and balance the State's interest in compensat-
ing private individuals for injury to their reputation against the
first amendment interest in protecting this type of expression."5"
The Court then concluded that there was a strong state interest
similar to the one in Gertz, but that the first amendment interest
involved was less than the one in Gertz. The Court based the lat-
ter conclusion on the belief that "[i]t is speech on 'matters of pub-
lic concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion.' "52 When a statement involves only matters of private
libel suits cost media defendants money and can result in self-censorship because of that
cost, and (2) libel plaintiffs want their reputation vindicated. Perhaps the most just solution
should concentrate on retractions and corrections. A correction does not cost the media a
great deal of money and it can at least limit the damage to a plaintiff's reputation.
Such a statute as Justice Brennan suggests might raise questions of constitutionality,
however. See id.; see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974)(Court decided on the same day as Gertz that a Florida statute requiring a newspa-
per to allow an attacked candidate to have free space in the paper is unconstitutional). Yet,
as Brennan suggests, a legislature can pass a law limiting damages where a defendant has
made a good faith effort to correct a defamatory error.
47. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 370. Justice White also criticized the Court for requiring a
plaintiff in a defamation action to prove actual damages and for limiting punitive damages
to cases in which the defendant had published a knowing falsehood or acted with reckless
disregard of the truth. Id. at 392-98. Justice White argued that defamatory falsehoods
about private individuals serve no purpose in aiding the quality or quantity of public de-
bate. Id. at 399-400. Further, it is possible "that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks
about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves
with social problems. This would turn the First Amendment on its head." Id. at 400.
48. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
49. Id. at 763.
50. Id. at 761-62.
51. Id. at 757.
52. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978)(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
1988-89]
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concern, there "'is no threat to the free and robust debate of pub-
lic issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dia-
logue of ideas concerning self-government.' "51 Such speech is not
totally unprotected, but since there is a lower constitutional value
for speech that is not of public concern, the Court held "that the
state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and puni-
tive damages - even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'"" Jus-
tice White, in a concurring opinion, criticized New York Times
and Gertz. 5
In addition to the state of mind of the defendant, which is the
focus of the actual malice standard, the veracity of the alleged
libelous statement is also an issue in a libel case. After New York
Times, the Court concluded that "a public figure plaintiff must
show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a
suit for defamation." 56 In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,57
the Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, extended this bur-
den to some private-figure plaintiffs by holding that "at least
where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-
figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that
the statements at issue are false. ' 58 The Court reasoned that the
burden of proof would be important in cases where the fact-find-
ing process would be unable to resolve whether the speech was
true or false. Since either the plaintiff or defendant must lose in
such a case and since the Constitution favors free speech, the
Court placed the burden on the plaintiff when the speech is of
53. Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361,
366, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1977)).
54. Id. at 761.
55. Id. at 767. Justice White, in supporting the importance of the state interest,
claimed that the New York Times rule creates "two evils":
[F]irst, the stream of information about public officials and public affairs is pol-
luted and often remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation
and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods
that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts.
Id. at 769.
Finally, Justice White stated that because discovery was likely to be very expensive in
a case governed by the New York Times test, the press might not be worse off financially if
common law rules were applied along with a cap on damages. Id. at 774. Furthermore, a
damage limit would not be unfair to libel plaintiffs, who are "very likely more interested in
clearing their names than in damages." Id.
56. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 768-69.
[Vol. 39:867
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public concern. 59
In addition to the previous cases which form the current
structure of libel law, two other Supreme Court cases, Greenbelt
Cooperative Public Association, Inc. v. Bresler60 and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,61 are important because they arguably sup-
port the belief that Gertz creates a privilege for opinions. In
Greenbelt, the Court held that an obvious use of "rhetorical hy-
perbole" would not subject a newspaper to liability for defama-
tion.62 Claiming that "even the most careless reader must have
perceived that the [use of the word 'blackmail' in the newspaper
article] was no more than rhetorical hyperbole,"6' 3 the Court
stated that to permit liability in such a case "would subvert the
most fundamental meaning of a free press."'6 4 More recently, the
Court in Falwell held that the publisher of a magazine was not
liable for invasion of privacy for publishing an advertisement par-
ody about a public figure. The Court stated that "[a]t the heart of
the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern."6 5
59. Id. at 793.
60. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
61. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Another Supreme Court case that arguably supports the
opinion privilege is Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n. of Letter Carriers v. Aus-
tin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). Decided the same day as Gertz, Old Dominion dealt with a union
campaign, where the union published in its monthly newsletter a "List of Scabs," listing
those people who had not joined the union. Several weeks later, the list was published
again, along with a definition of "scab," which included insulting language and the phrase,
"a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class." Id. at 267-68.
Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice Marshall stated that the union's use of
the word "scab" was protected under federal law and could not be the basis of a libel
judgment. The Court held that "[s]uch words were obviously used here in a loose, figura-
tive sense to demonstrate the union's strong disagreement with the views of those workers
who oppose unionization. Expression of such an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms,
is protected under federal labor law." Id. at 284. The importance of the Old Dominion
decision is limited because it was decided under federal labor law, not the first amendment.
The Court focused on an executive order, the National Labor Relations Act, and union
cases in determining that "federal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or
insulting language without fear of. . . penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective
means to make its point." Id. at 283.
All caveats aside, Old Dominion is important because, like Gertz, Greenbelt, and
Falwell, it implies an opinion privilege. Furthermore, although holding that such an opin-
ion is protected under federal labor law, the Court quoted Gertz in support by stating that
"lh]ere, too, 'there is no such thing as a false idea.'" Id. at 284.
62. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 879.
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B. Concerns in the Area of Libel Law
Throughout the Supreme Court cases dealing with libel, there
have been a number of concerns articulated by various Justices.
On one side, there is the state interest in protecting the right of
the individual not to be injured by libel. This interest is fairly
straightforward, and the objectives are clear. Those who have
been defamed want an opportunity to obtain damages and clear
their names. However, the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press conflict with the state interest. In
order to balance the interest of a free press with the state interest,
the rationale behind freedom of speech and freedom of the press
must be understood.
The forefathers of the United States had a unique faith in the
people. This faith led them to provide that the voice of the people
would not be silenced by fear of the government or anyone else.
As Thomas Jefferson stated: "If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form,
let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which
error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to com-
bat it."6 Our forefathers believed that a free society thrives on
ideas.67 It is only through a free exchange of ideas that desired
social and political change can take place. 8 As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated in a dissenting opinion many years before
New York Times:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.69
A free press allows the people to speak out. The threat of
66. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340-n.8 (1974).
67. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. For an interesting discussion of
the twentieth-century understanding of first amendment values, see Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521, 544-67 (1977). Pro-
fessor Blasi discusses the first amendment's role in "individual autonomy," "diversity," and
"self-government." Id.
69. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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defamation lawsuits, however, acts as a deterrent to a free press.
Although not a governmental deterrent, this economic deterrent
can prevent or hinder the free exchange of ideas.
The cases discussed thus far indicate that there are a number
of concerns involved in balancing freedom of the press with the
state interest of protecting individuals from defamation: (1) The
press must be given sufficient "breathing space" so they will not
resort to self-censorship to prevent lawsuits (self-censorship con-
cern);7 0 (2) discussion of issues and persons of public concern is
more important than discussion of private issues and persons
(public/private concern);71 and (3) when the freedom of the press
is not being infringed upon, individuals have a right to remedies
for their injuries due to defamation (remedial concern). 2
II. THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION: THE TESTS
A. Introduction
After having examined the Supreme Court cases that form
the foundation for the conflict between libel law and freedom of
the press, one can approach the issues presented by the opinion
privilege. First, this Note will discuss the tests which are used by
the lower courts to distinguish fact from opinion. Second, the un-
derlying assumptions of the Gertz dicta will be questioned. Third,
the opinion privilege and fact-opinion tests will be examined in
light of the concerns expressed in the Supreme Court cases previ-
ously discussed. Finally, this Note will propose a way to eliminate
the fact/opinion problem by returning to a Rosenbloom-type
approach.
70. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 15-59 and accompanying text. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITI-
CAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 79 (1965):
If... as our argument has tried to show, the principal of the freedom of speech
is derived ... from the necessities of self-government by universal suffrage ...
. The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all speak-
ing. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues
with which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to the consideration of matters
of public interest.
72. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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B. The Scott/Ollman Test: Totality of the Circumstances"3
Oilman v. Evans1 4 was a libel suit brought by Professor
Bertell Olman against Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. It in-
volved a column written by Evans and Novak which was pub-
lished in The Washington Post and other newspapers around the
country. The controversial article, entitled "The Marxist Profes-
sor's Intentions," appeared when Olman, a professor of political
science at New York University, was relocating to head the De-
partment of Government and Politics at the University of Mary-
land. 5 Pointing out Ollman's Marxist philosophy, the article
stated that Ollman's "'candid writings avow his desire to use the
classroom as an instrument for preparing what he calls "the
revolution." '".76 The article went on to state:
"He is widely viewed in his profession as a political activist...
he is an outspoken proponent of 'political Marxism.' . . . Such
pamphleteering is hooted at by one political scientist in a major
eastern university, whose scholarship and reputation as a liberal
are well known. 'Oilman has no status within the profession, but
is a pure and simple activist,' he said. 77
After the district court granted Evans' and Novak's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the statements were protected
opinion, Olman appealed. 8
Judge Starr, writing the opinion for the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals, cited the Gertz dicta that "[u]nder the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea"7 9 and concluded that opin-
ions are privileged. He then looked to the Supreme Court cases
Old Dominion and Greenbelt for guidance in distinguishing fact
from opinion.80 After noting the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween fact and opinion, Judge Starr settled on the totality of cir-
cumstances test:
73. One must be careful in using the phrase "totality of circumstances test" in this
area of the law. Courts use this phrase when discussing a number of factors, but the actual
factors used can vary. This Note will, for the most part, use the case name(s) identified
with the different variations when comparing the tests, in order to limit the confusion.
74. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
75. Id. at 971-72.
76. Id. at 972 (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at 972-73 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 973-74.
79. Id. at 974.
80. Id. at 976-77.
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First, we will analyze the common usage or meaning of the
specific language of the challenged statement itself, . . . deter-
mining whether the statement has a precise core of meaning
.. . or . . . whether the statement is indefinite and ambigu-
ous. . . . Second, we will consider the statement's verifiability
- is the statement capable of being objectively characterized as
true or false? ... Third. .. we will consider the full context of
the statement . . . inasmuch as other, unchallenged language
surrounding the allegedly defamatory statement will influence
the average reader's readiness to infer that a particular state-
ment has factual content. Finally, we will consider the broader
context or setting in which the statement appears. 81
These guidelines have been followed in a number of libel cases.8 2
Judge Starr supported the first prong of his test - ambiguity
by citing cases which held vague statements unactionable8 3 He
supported the second prong - verifiability - by arguing that "a
reader cannot rationally view an unverifiable statement as convey-
ing actual facts." 4 He further argued that "[1]acking a clear
method of verification with which to evaluate a statement. . . the
trier of fact may improperly tend to render a decision based upon
approval or disapproval of the contents of the statement, its au-
thor, or its subject."8 5 Judge Starr supported the third prong -
the immediate context of the statement - by claiming that read-
ers will be influenced by the statement's context.8 6 Finally, he sup-
ported the fourth prong - the broader social context - by claim-
ing that "[s]ome types of writing or speech by custom or
convention signal to readers or listeners that what is being read or
heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."87
81. Id. at 979 (citations omitted).
82. See Janklow v. Newsweek Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
883 (1986); Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985);
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ct. App.
1986).
83. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979-81.
84. Id. at 981.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 982.
87. Id. at 983. Judge Starr then considered a second level of analysis that some
courts have used after determining whether a statement was an opinion or a fact. Relying
upon section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, some courts "consider whether the
opinion implies the existence of undisclosed facts as the basis for the opinion. If the opinion
implied factual assertions, courts have held that it should not receive the benefit of First
Amendment protection as opinion." Id. at 984 (footnote omitted). Judge Starr, however,
stated that his four-prong test was "a sufficient aid in determining whether a statement
implies the existence of undisclosed facts." Id. at 985.
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Judge Starr applied the totality of circumstances test to vari-
ous portions of the article and concluded that the article was privi-
leged opinion. He focused on the fact that the article was "by
well-known, nationally syndicated columnists on the Op-Ed page
of a newspaper, the well-recognized home of opinion and com-
ment."88 Furthermore, Judge Starr noted that the columnists ex-
pressly stated that Ollman was a professor at a respected univer-
sity, thus giving the reader objective evidence of Ollman's
standing. Also, the column stated that "Ollman's imminent ascen-
sion to the departmental chairmanship at Maryland was troubling
only to a clear minority of academics. Thus, the charge of 'no
status' in this context would plainly appear to the average reader
to be 'rhetorical hyperbole' within the meaning of Greenbelt,
which would lead the reader to treat the statement as one of
opinion."89
In a concurring opinion joined by Judges Wilkey, Ginsburg,
and MacKinnon, Judge Bork stated that Judge Starr's test was
inadequate to immunize the statements at issue as expressions of
opinion. 90 Judge Bork contended that the court should have ex-
amined the following, additional factors:
Ollman, by his own actions, entered a political arena in which
heated discourse was to be expected and must be protected; the
"fact" proposed to be tried is in truth wholly unsuitable for trial,
which further imperils free discussion; the statement is not of
the kind that would usually be accepted as one of hard fact and
appeared in a context that further indicated it was rhetorical
hyperbole.91
Judge Bork argued that "in order to protect a vigorous market-
place in political ideas and contentions, we ought to accept the
proposition that those who place themselves in a political arena
must accept a degree of degradation that others need not."92
While admitting that his public arena context is similar to the
public figure protection of New York Times, Judge Bork stated
that Supreme Court cases giving a privilege to rhetorical hyper-
bole recognized that New York Times protection is not always
88. Id. at 990.
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 993.
91. Id. at 1002.
92. Id.
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adequate. 3
Chief Judge Robinson, joined by Judge Wright, dissented in
part. Chief Judge Robinson viewed the problem as a continuum
with "pure" opinion at one end and representations of fact at the
other. He defined "hybrid statements" as statements that most
people would regard as possibly true or false, depending on the
"backgound" facts. 4 Robinson held "that a hybrid statement is
absolutely privileged as opinion when it is accompanied by a rea-
sonably full and accurate narration of the facts pertinent to the
author's conclusion."9 5 He further held that "hybrid statements
not so accompanied are not entitled to that degree of protection
unless those facts are already known to the author's listeners or
readers.""8 This approach is similar to the Restatement rule.97 In
applying his test to the case, Chief Judge Robinson concluded that
some of the passages may not have been supported by an adequate
amount of background material, therefore they created a genuine
issue to be decided by a jury.98
The dissent by Judge Wald was joined by Judges Edwards
and Scalia. Judge Wald adopted Judge Starr's test, but claimed
that "the columnists' statement that 'Oilman has no status within
the profession, but is a pure and simple activist' is an assertion of
fact for which its authors can be made to answer." 99 Judge Wald
concluded that the statement had a stable core of meaning and
that the statement was verifiable. 100
Scott v. The News Herald,101 an Ohio Supreme Court deci-
sion, followed the reasoning of Ollman. Scott centered on the
events surrounding a wrestling match between two high schools.
Following a controversial call against the home team, a "fracas"
ensued which involved the crowd and the teams. Later, a hearing
was held by the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OH-
SAA). H. Don Scott, who had attended the match as the Superin-
tendent of the Maple Heights School System, and Michael
Milkovich, Sr., the Maple Heights High School head coach, Sr.,
93. Id. at 1005.
94. Id. at 1022.
95. Id. at 1024.
96. Id. (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 1027.
98. Id. at 1031-32.
99. Id. at 1032.
100. Id. at 1033.
101. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
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testified at the hearing. After the hearing, OHSAA placed the
Maple Heights team on probation and censured Milkovich for his
actions during the match. 1"2
After the court of common pleas reversed OHSAA's decision,
The News-Herald published a column by J. Theodore Diadiun on
the sports page, entitled "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie.'"
The words "TD Says" appeared in large print under the title.10 3
Diadiun stated in the article that "'[a]nyone who attended the
meet . . . knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the
hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth.' "104 Scott sued.
Justice Locher, writing for the Ohio Supreme Court, affirmed
the decision in favor of The News-Herald. The majority opinion
began by citing the Gertz dicta which created the opinion privi-
lege.10 5 After stating that a fact-opinion determination is a matter
of law, Justice Locher adopted the totality of circumstances test,
noting that "[t]his test, however, can only be used as a compass to
show general direction and not a map to set rigid boundaries."10 6
Citing Olman v. Evans,107 Justice Locher stated that the totality
of circumstances test "involves at least four factors. First is the
specific language used, second is whether the statement is verifia-
ble, third is the general context of the statement and fourth is the
broader context in which the statement appeared."'0l8 Justice
Locher then applied the test to the case at hand.
First, Locher examined the specific language of Diadiun's ar-
ticle and concluded that the article clearly stated that Scott had
lied under oath. If the analysis ended after this initial examination
then Scott would have had a valid cause of action. Locher stated,
however, that this was only the beginning of the inquiry. Second,
Locher concluded that the statements in the article were objec-
tively verifiable through a perjury action. Therefore, the first two
factors in the totality of circumstances test weighed in Scott's
favor.
The final two factors, however, led the court to hold that the
102. Id. at 243, 496 N.E.2d at 700.
103. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701-02.
104. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 702.
105. Id. at 244-45, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
106. Id. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706.
107. OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
108. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 496 NI.E.2d at 706.
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statements in the article were protected opinion. In considering
the third factor, the general context of the statements, Justice
Locher gave weight to the fact that the article began with "TD
Says," although he stated that labeling an article "opinion"
should not "be a dispositive method of avoiding judicial scru-
tiny."' 10  Locher also found that the context of the statements at
issue revealed to the reader that Diadiun was biased. The Ohio
court went on to state that the subjectivity of the article was indi-
cated by the phrase: "Anyone who attended the meet . . . knows
in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied . . ."110 Finally, Jus-
tice Locher examined the fourth element - the broader context
of the remarks. He stated that it was significant that the article
appeared on the sports page, "a traditional haven for cajoling, in-
vective, and hyperbole."'11 In concluding that "legal conclusions"
in this context probably would be viewed as the writer's opinion,
the court held that the article was protected opinion under both
the "federal and Ohio Constitutions."" 2
Three justices filed concurring opinions in Scott, agreeing
that the totality of circumstances test should be applied. Three
other justices dissented in regard to the test. In one of these dis-
senting opinions, Chief Justice Celebrezze criticized the totality of
circumstances test "which is used to complete the Jekyll and
Hyde transformation of this newspaper article from fact to opin-
ion. This test is not only unworkable, it is applied by the majority
in self-contradictory fashion to reach an untenable result."" 3
Justice Sweeney claimed that "the majority's new 'test' is in
reality no test at all, because its components can be juxtaposed to
forge any interpretation that the user of the 'test' desires.""' Jus-
tice Clifford Brown chided the totality of circumstances test as "so
malleable and spongy as to permit any interpretation anyone
wishes."" 5 Further, Justice Brown stated that:
The standardless four-factor test for distinguishing fact from
opinion, as applied here in Scott, makes every statement of fact
109. Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
110. Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709.
113. Id. at 263, 496 N.E.2d at 716. Further, Chief Justice Celebrezze claimed that
"[s]uch criminal accusations [perjury], even if expressed as opinion, are not entitled to
absolute constitutional protection." Id. at 265, 496 N.E.2d at 717.
114. Id. at 267, 496 N.E.2d at 719.
115. Id. at 273, 496 N.E.2d at 723.
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a statement of opinion in every case and therefore not actiona-
ble. This is a deprivation of every libeled plaintiff's rights under
both the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution
116
C. The Restatement Test
The Restatement test for libel is as follows: "A defamatory
communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opin-
ion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion."117 This test is similar to the one applied by Chief Judge
Robinson in his partial dissent in Ollman.11 8 It draws distinctions
between pure opinion and mixed opinion, defining the latter as
"one which, while an opinion in form or context, is apparently
based on facts regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that have not
been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the parties to
the communication.""19 A number of courts have used the Re-
statement test in a variety of ways, often in conjunction with one
of the totality of circumstances tests.' 20
D. Other Totality of Circumstances Tests
In Information Control v. Genesis One Computer,12' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used a total-
ity of the circumstances test similar to the one used in Olman
and Scott, but omitted the verifiability factor. In order to deter-
mine whether a statement was fact or opinion, the court consid-
ered three factors:
[T]he test to be applied . . . requires that the court examine
the statement in its totality in the context in which it was ut-
tered or published. The court must consider all the words used,
not merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the
116. Id. at 276, 496 N.E.2d at 725 (footnote omitted).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
118. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, comment b (1977).
120. See, e.g., Redco Corp. v. CBS, 758 F.2d 970 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
843 (1985); Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782 (Me.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1241 (1984); Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337
(1983); Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982); Steinhilber
v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1986); Dunlap
v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986).
121. Information Control v. Genesis One Computer, 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
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court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person
publishing the statement. Finally, the court must consider all of
the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the me-
dium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience
to which it is published.122
Other courts have also used this test. 23
The dispute in Information Control arose after the following
comment by counsel for Genesis was published in an industry
journal and later issued by Genesis in a press release: "'In the
opinion of Genesis' management, the action by ICC is intended as
a device by ICC to avoid payment of its obligations to Genesis
. . ",124 The court of appeals held that the statement was a
privileged opinion, focusing on the words "'[i]n the opinion of
Genesis' management,' ",125 as well as the fact that such "fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole" should be expected in an article in a trade
publication dealing with a lawsuit between business litigants.12
In Dunlap v. Wayne,127 the Supreme Court of Washington
considered a different set of factors in applying the totality of cir-
cumstances test: "(1) the medium and context in which the state-
ment was published, (2) the audience to whom it was published,
and (3) whether the statement implies undisclosed facts."' 28
Based on these factors, the court held that a letter from a real
estate partner's attorney to a savings and loan branch manager's
attorney was a nonactionable expression of opinion.12 9
III. ANALYZING THE FACT-OPINION TESTS
In evaluating the fact-opinion tests, one must first examine
the Gertz dicta to identify the foundations for the opinion privi-
lege, then analyze how well the tests meet the goals of the opinion
privilege. The dicta provides three bases for such a privilege: (1)
"[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false
122. Id. at 784.
123. See, e.g., Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo.
1983); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 121, 448 A.2d
1317, 1326 (1982).
124. Information Control, 611 F.2d at 783 (court alteration omitted).
125. Id. at 784.
126. Id. (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 522
P.2d 425, 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976)).
127. 105 Wash. 2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986).
128. Id. at 539, 716 P.2d at 848.
129. Id. at 543, 716 P.2d at 850.
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idea," 130 (2) "there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact,' 131 and (3) "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas." '32
The first basis, the belief that an idea cannot be false, is con-
sistent with the verifiability prong of the Olman/Scott test, which
holds that a statement that is verifiable is more likely to be a
"fact.' 33 If this Gertz assumption is correct, the Ollman ver-
ifiability prong is useful in determining whether a statement is an
opinion.
Some illustrations, however, will show that this foundation
for the opinion privilege is based upon a weak assumption. Sup-
pose A is talking on a telephone and he tells C, "I believe B is not
here." Is that statement verifiable? One can argue that it is an
opinion because one cannot verify what A "believes." Yet, suppose
D was present with A and B when A answered the phone, and A
made the statement while looking at B. Would that create a situa-
tion where the statement is verifiable by D - that A cannot be-
lieve B is not present? Would the statement be a verifiable false
opinion?
Still, one could say A's statement is not verifiable because we
cannot know what A "believes," even knowing what A sees. But
this reasoning leads back to the question: What is "verifiable"?
John Brown reads that there is no life on the moon. Is that verifia-
ble to him? Or to ask a more general question, is verifiability rela-
tive? Mr. Brown, a judge, cannot verify the statement by going to
the moon, but someone else can (and has if one believes Neil
Armstrong's historic step). What of the statement, "there is other
life in the universe?" One cannot verify this statement today, but
maybe in the future it will be verified. One can see the problems
with assuming that opinions cannot be false. What is verifiable?
"Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?"' 34
The second basis for the opinion privilege, that false state-
ments of fact have no value, also provides a weak foundation for
an opinion privilege. False statements of fact can be valuable.
"The sun travels around the earth," while obviously a false state-
130. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
131. Id. at 340.
132. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
133. See supra notes 81-116 and accompanying text.
134. St. John 18:38 (King James).
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ment of fact, was probably a commonplace statement two thou-
sand years ago. Moreover, beliefs based on this false statement of
fact enabled our ancestors to predict when the sun would rise and
when the seasons would change. 35 Surely, there was some value
in that statement. At the very least, it was more valuable than
saying that Scott lied, especially if Scott did tell the truth and
nevertheless was damaged by the statement. Of course, one could
argue that the sun statement is an opinion, or at least was at the
time before it was proven wrong. But then, the verifiability prob-
lem is faced again, and one can argue that nothing is verifiable.
One could argue that while the sun statement has value, it
does not have "constitutional value." Yet, it seems unreasonable
not to protect a useful statement just because it is called a "fact"
when the line between "fact" and "opinion" is far from bright.
Even the New York Times Court noted that "a false statement
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public de-
bate."' 36 The basis for protecting opinions is that they are valua-
ble to society. Facts, whether true or false, that are valuable to
society should also be protected.
At best, the foundation provided by Gertz's first two bases is
weak. The statements "there is no such thing as a false idea" and
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact" are
not absolute truths.
The third basis for the opinion privilege, a faith in the compe-
tition of ideas, is consistent with the self-censorship concern of li-
bel law. 137 Although it is arguable whether opinions really are
more valuable than facts, the strongest rationale for the opinion
privilege is based on a fear that libel suits will be used to punish
ideas.138 Our society has accepted the fact that ideas have an im-
portant role in society, and therefore deserve protection from libel
suits. The self-censorship concern was summed up by the New
York Times Court, which pointed out that the founders of our
country:
"[K]new that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
135. HANSON, CONSTELLATIONS AND CONJECTURES 20 (1973). Further, "most rea-
sonable men at the time of Homer-and the Old Testament-would not have entertained
any explanation of the first fact of the heavens which made the earth other than immova-
ble. Why should they? They were prudent and wise then to treat their data thus. Their sun
and stars, then, simply moved in perfect circles over our immobile earth." Id. at 20-21.
136. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
137. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
138. R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 249 (1986).
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punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed si-
lence coerced by law - the argument of force in its worst
form."13 9
The opinion privilege serves this goal in theory, conferring
upon ideas an immunity from libel suits. Yet, the issue here is
whether the fact-opinion tests prevent self-censorship and aid in
the free flow of ideas in practice. The tests need to be examined to
determine what the courts are actually protecting. If the tests do
not result in preventing self-censorship, they do not serve Gertz's
only legitimate justification for the opinion privilege.
In the attempt to determine when a statement is an "opin-
ion," the totality of circumstances tests are helpful in that they
acknowledge that words can have different meanings in different
contexts. The sentence "Reds kill Yankees" has entirely different
meanings depending on whether it appears in a sports article or in
a headline about homicidal communists. Acknowledging that
words can be ambiguous is the first step in analyzing the tests.
The second and more difficult step is the attempt to actually de-
termine their meanings, and ultimately, whether the words are
meant to be an opinion.
The basic totality test presented in Information Control v.
Genesis One Computer considers three factors: (1) the words in
the statement, (2) the surrounding words, and (3) the surrounding
circumstances. 40 These factors are helpful in determining mean-
ing, but how conclusive are they? How much weight should be
given to various words? How much weight should be given to dif-
ferent circumstances?
The Olman case adds the verifiability prong to the basic to-
tality of circumstances test. As previously discussed, the assump-
tion that opinions cannot be verified is weak. Yet, this prong of
the test may have a functional use, since a reader ought to give
139. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)(quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
140. Information Control v. Genesis One Computer, 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir.
1980).
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less weight to something appearing to be unverifiable and there-
fore should view the statement as an opinion.
Some courts have supplemented the totality test with the Re-
statement test, making an opinion actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts. Olman criticized the
Restatement test because "factors besides the disclosure of facts
are relevant in determining whether a statement implies factual
allegations to the reasonable reader." 141 The court in Ollman ar-
gued that because an article was on the Op-Ed page, among other
factors, it would not matter if other undisclosed facts were
implied.1 42
In reality, the Restatement test is not a test for distinguishing
fact from opinion. This test only applies to statements already de-
termined to be opinions. The Restatement test limits the opinion
privilege. If a statement is a "fact," it may be actionable.1 43 If it
is an "opinion," it can only be actionable "if it implies the allega-
tion of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.
In addition to the limits placed on the privilege by the Re-
statement test, some courts hold that specific accusations of crimi-
nal conduct expressed in the form of an opinion are not pro-
tected. 45 When applying the Restatement test, these courts look
at the facts implied by such an opinion. 146 But if Gertz really
meant that opinions are privileged, all opinions should be privi-
leged, not just some opinions. The Restatement test, in reality,
makes implied facts as well as 6xpress facts actionable. This con-
tention is consistent with one of the Restatement comments, which
states that both direct and indirect statements of fact may be ac-
tionable.1 47 Therefore, it seems that if one considered the sur-
141. OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
142. Id.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565 (1977).
144. Id.
145. Cianci v. New Times Publishing, 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980)(statement in mag-
azine article claiming that the plaintiff-mayor had once been accused of rape and paid off
the accuser was not protected as a statement of opinion); see also Burns v. McGraw-Hill
Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983)(published claim that wife "deserted" hus-
band when she actually had filed for and secured a divorce held actionble).
146. Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Colo.
1983)(noting that the defendant's use of the word "deserted" implied "to abandon without
warning").
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565, comment b (1977). Comment b
states that:
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rounding context of a statement and what it implied when apply-
ing one of the totality ,tests, these implied facts would already
have been considered. Furthermore, liability could be found with-
out using a fact-opinion test at all. Therefore, the second step of
applying the Restatement test becomes unnecessary.
Indeed, the court in Olman. agreed that the same result is
achieved with or without the Restatement test as a second step. In
a footnote, the Olman tlurality referred to an example from the
comment to the Restatement: "A writes to B about his neighbor
C: 'I think he must be an alcoholic.' ",148 Judge Starr pointed out
that the Restatement "indicates that this remark should be sub-
mitted to the jury as a statement that may imply that 'A knew
undisclosed facts that would justify his opinion.' ",149 Judge Starr
reached the same conclusion applying the Olman totality test. He
reasoned that the social context indicates that the statement is
probably fact "because a neighbor would generally be thought
likely to be in a position to report facts, namely . . . [because] he
has been in a position to make first-hand observations." 150 Fur-
thermore, "the statement. . . is so well defined and verifiable that
the language ['I think'] . . . would be given relatively little
weight."15
One may argue that a court leaning towards free expression
might use the Ollman test to reach a different result in the com-
ment's hypothetical case, either by giving more weight to the
words "I think" or by claiming that gossipy neighbors are as unre-
liable as the sportswriters referred to in Scott.152 Yet, Judge Starr
shows that the argument can be made that the results via the
Olman test or via the Restatement test can be the same. Further-
more, much depends on how the Ollman test is applied. If looking
To be defamatory under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary that
the accusation or other statement be by words. It is enough that the communica-
tion is reasonably capable of being understood as charging something defama-
tory. Thus another may be defamed by a statement that he associates with per-
sons of notoriously disreputable character or by attributing to him the
characteristics of literary or historical figures of ill repute.
148. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,;986 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566, illustration
3 (1977)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Scott v. The News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708
(1986).
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at the total context means also looking at implied facts, then the
Restatement test is incorporated in the totality of circumstances
tests. Therefore, the results often depend upon how the courts ap-
ply the tests.
These fact-opinion tests provide a means for offering constitu-
tional protection to statements held to be opinions. Yet, the tests
themselves are hazy and offer little guidance. One federal court,
while not rejecting such tests, stated that "[t]he determination of
whether a statement is one of opinion or fact . . . is difficult to
make and perhaps unreliable as a basis for decision. 153 Another
court, dealing with the fact-opinion distinction, stated that "[t]he
infinite variety of meanings conveyed by words - depending on
the words themselves and their purpose, the circumstances sur-
rounding their use, and the manner, tone and style with which
they are used - rules out, in our view, a formulistic approach." '
The fact-opinion distinction does appear to serve the self-cen-
sorship concern by providing the press with more breathing room.
Anything a court labels an "opinion" is immune from a defama-
tion suit, thereby seeming to encourage open debate on any issue.
However, this reasoning may not stand up. Granting extra protec-
tion to opinions may not serve the intended goal of discouraging
self-censorship. The only protection that substantially discourages
self-censorship is a predictable protection. If a newspaper reporter
is not sure whether an article makes him liable for defamation,
the opinion privilege may not be enough to encourage him to print
it. The tests used by courts to determine whether a statement is an
opinion are merely "compasses," not "maps,"1 55 adding little pre-
dictability to the privilege. Few people in the media would be able
to predict that it is permissible to say "[e]veryone knows in his
heart that Scott lied" in a sports editorial but not "I think X is an
alcoholic." 156 While it is true that the test allows an unsure jour-
153. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 692 F.2d 189, 194 (Ist Cir. 1982), affd, 466
U.S. 485 (1984).
154. Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 291, 501 N.E.2d 550, 554, 508
N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (Ct. App. 1986); see also McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (1st
Cir. 1987). "However, courts that have tried 'to apply the fact/opinion distinction have
discovered that speech does not always break'down into such clear categories." Id.
155. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706.
156. Under Scott, a newspaper may print the phrase, "[a]nyone who attended the
meet. . . knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied" and be immune from liability.
Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701. Under Ollman, a newspaper is immune
from liability when it quotes the statement, "Ollman has no status within the profession."
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
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nalist to use a little more cautionary language to help protect him-
self from liability, the totality of circumstances test does not offer
much predictability when considering the potential liability of the
media. Even if a fact-opinion test requires a court to consider all
relevant factors, it may riot provide much comfort to a journalist
who cannot be sure that he is weighing all the factors in deciding
not to censor himself. The fact-opinion tests are insufficient guide-
lines. "Compasses" allow judges too much discretion and add lit-
tle, if any, predictability to the protection. The appearance that
the fact-opinion tests serve the Self-Censorship Concern is merely
an illusion. Protection at the whim of the judges is no protection
at all.
The Olman and Scott cases illustrate potential problems of
broad judicial discretion in this area. Some commentators suggest
juries in libel cases may really be trying the popularity of the
statement at issue.' 57 However, similar problems can arise with
judges. Olman was a unique case, pitting a liberal plaintiff
against the liberal belief in freedom of the press, resulting in a
strange alignment of the judges. Conservative Judges MacKinnon
and Bork aligned with liberal Judge Ginsburg in protecting free-
dom of the press, while liberal Judges Wald and Edwards joined
with conservative Judge Scalia in finding a cause of action against
the newspaper. 158 One can only speculate what role, if any, the
politics of the plaintiff and the judges will play in future cases.
Further, one justice in Scott noted the possible influence of an
upcoming election on how his colleagues voted. 159 If judges and
juries are influenced by improper factors, at least juries are con-
strained by the stricter guidelines of actual malice and falsity,
while the judges may rely only on the nebulous fact-opinion tests
to guide them.
Yet, one can argue that the fact-opinion distinction does pro-
vide some degree of protection for the press. The fact-opinion dis-
tinction is a question of law and therefore a vehicle for the press
to obtain a summary judgment, avoid the cost of litigation, and
1127 (1985). Yet, Judge Starr claims that the statement "I think B is an alcoholic" is not
privileged, and the poor neighbor has to pay a libel judgment while the News-Herald and
Evans go free. Id. at 986 n.31.
157. Note, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1028 (1986).
158. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 970.
159. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 275, 496 N.E.2d at 725 (Brown, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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avoid a possibly prejudiced jury.160 High litigation costs even deter
a winning media defendant from speaking out on controversial
issues. 61
The opinion privilege, however, is not the best way to protect
the press. The summary judgment stage may be the ideal time to
protect the press, but not with an unpredictable test. Even one
supporter of the opinion privilege has admitted that "[i]n order
for the opinion privilege to serve to invigorate the press, . . . the
privilege itself must be doctrinally clear and predictable. An un-
clear or hazy test . . adds to the doctrinal confusion, which in
turn heightens a publisher's perception of the risk of liability." '
An opinion privilege is a press protection, but it is an unpredict-
able and marginal protection. Also, a media defendant can secure
a summary judgment on other grounds, such as if the plaintiff
fails to present clear and convincing evidence that could support a
reasonable jury finding of actual malice.1 13 Therefore, a better so-
lution is to discourage plaintiffs from suing by increasing their
burdens of proof or giving a blanket privilege to both "facts" and
"opinions."
Furthermore, the fact-opinion distinction may actually in-
crease litigation costs. In addition to litigating malice and falsity
issues, a newspaper may have to litigate the fact-opinion issue.
Without a clear-cut fact-opinion rule, the additional litigation
could be costly.
Having concluded that the first two Gertz propositions do not
support an opinion privilege and that in practice the fact-opinion
tests only marginally serve the self-censorship concern, the other
libel law concerns not mentioned in the Gertz dicta, the public/
private concern and the remedial concern, must be considered. A
brief examination of these libel law concerns will reveal that they
also are not served in practice or in theory.
The public/private concern is not served at all by the fact-
opinion distinction. Except for Judge Bork's formulation of the
opinion privilege in Ollman,' courts generally do not consider
160. See Note, supra note 157, at 1028; see also SMOLLA, supra note 138, at 247-49.
161. Note, supra note 157, at 1028.
162. Id. at 1028.
163. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986)(holding that a
trial court may grant summary judgment to a defendant in a libel case if a public figure
plaintiff does not present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that actual malice
has been shown with convincing clarity).
164. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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whether the person libeled is a public or private figure in deter-
mining whether something is a fact or an opinion."6 5 This concern
is dealt with at another stage of the procedure when the court
determines the level of a defendant's culpability that a plaintiff
must prove. The goal of distinguishing private from public discus-
sion is actually inhibited by the opinion privilege, since discussion
about private matters and people is elevated to a constitutionally
privileged level when it is labeled an "opinion," despite the Su-
preme Court's explicit intention that these plaintiffs should have a
lower burden of proof than public plaintiffs. The Supreme Court
has expressed concern over a private individual's right to obtain a
remedy in this area, even going so far as to allow states to impose
strict liability on the media where a defamation concerns a private
person and a private issue.' 6 The opinion privilege, however, al-
lows absolute immunity in the same situation if a court determines
that a statement is an "opinion."
Some courts, however, have been more willing to protect a
statement as an opinion where the statement deals with a matter
of public concern. 167 This willingness indicates a weakness in the
opinion tests. Whether a statement is an "opinion" has little to do
with whether the statement is of public concern. Perhaps these
courts are acknowledging the weaknesses in the rationale for a
blanket opinion privilege by looking beyond semantics and looking
at the value of a statement in determining whether it deserves
constitutional protection.
The remedial concern also is not served by the fact-opinion
tests. The privilege completely bars an injured party from a rem-
165. But see Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986)(incorporating factor of "public context" into the opinion test).
166. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
167. Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 47-48 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983). The
court stated: "[l]n the course of legitimate debate over issues of public importance, offen-
sive rhetoric on the borderline between fact and opinion is to be expected, and such state-
ments are much more deserving of constitutional protection than similar statements made
for purely private motives." Id. at 47-48 (citations omitted). See Baker v. Los Angeles
Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 265-69, 721 P.2d 87, 93-96, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212-15
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1360 (1987). The court stated
that "'[b]y giving weight on the opinion side of the scale to cautionary and interrogative
language, courts provide greater leeway to . . .commentators in bringing issues of public
importance to the public's attention and scrutiny.'" Id. at 269, 721 P.2d at 96, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 215 (quoting OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)). See also Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99
Nev. 404, 410-12, 664 P.2d 337, 342-43 (1983)(remarks in cases involving political com-
ment are more likely to be determined opinion rather than fact).
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edy. The plaintiff in Scott could have proven that the sportswriter
knew that Scott told the truth and only wrote that Scott lied be-
cause he disliked Scott; but Scott would have had no chance of
obtaining a remedy because the sportswriter wrote an "opinion."
Similarly, if the sportswriter disliked his neighbor, Fred (a private
individual), he could have written, "everyone knows that Fred is a
liar," and Fred could have done nothing because a court would
say it was an "opinion." Giving the media immunity to ridicule
anyone they desire as long as they do so in the form of an opinion
does not serve the remedial concern.
Of the three concerns of libel law, only the self-censorship
concern is served in theory by the opinion privilege. This concern
is perhaps the most important concern in this area, as it has a
constitutional basis. Yet, in practice, not even this concern is
served very well. The following alternative to the opinion privilege
would better serve the self-censorship concern, while also serving
the public/private concern and the remedial concern.
IV. THE SOLUTION
A. The Framework
States are free to impose greater barriers to an individual's
right to sue a newspaper, radio station, or television station for
defamation. Yet, lower courts have grasped at an inefficient press
protection, while damaging the rights of the individuals they are
supposed to protect. There is no justice in prohibiting an individ-
ual from seeking a remedy in exchange for a questionable press
protection.
The solution is to raise the protection of the press in certain
key areas instead of a blanket opinion privilege. This Note pro-
poses that courts should return to a Rosenbloom-type standard,
giving New York Times protection to al statements that deal with
public issues and holding the media to a reasonable care standard
for private issues. This structure serves the three concerns: (1)
preventing self-censorship, (2) allowing the individual a just rem-
edy, and (3) distinguishing publiC6from private debate.,6
A return to a Rosenbloom-type standard serves the self-cen-
sorship concern because the media primarily deals with public is-
sues and the media's level of protection would be raised in the
168. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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area where plaintiffs are private individuals involved in public is-
sues. Consequently, a newspaper could print most of its articles
without fear of liability for defamation, as long as it is not
reckless.
The remedial concern is served because in no instance is an
individual barred from a remedy. Certainly, it will often be diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to prove his case, but that is the price society
pays for a free press. Under the Rosenbloom approach, at least, a
plaintiff has a remedy. A plaintiff should prefer a small chance
over no chance at all. Leaving this slim chance of liability open
also prevents a medium from abusing the privilege, which is a pos-
sibility when it is immune from liability for "opinions."
The public/private concern is satisfied because this solution
realizes that public debate has a greater value than private de-
bate. There is no constitutional basis for giving the media free rein
in discussing "opinions" about private individuals in areas of pri-
vate concern. Those plaintiffs must be given a chance in the
courts, while maintaining a solid protection for the media against
other plaintiffs. The next issue is whether this solution which
moves the line from public/private figure to public/private debate
is correct from a practical perspective.
B. In Defense of Rosenbloom
In Gertz, Justice Powell gave four reasons for returning to a
status-oriented approach and rejecting the Rosenbloom approach.
First, he claimed that private individuals are more vulnerable to
defamation than public individuals because they do not have ac-
cess to channels of communication to rebut the defamatory state-
ments. Second, he claimed that society has a greater interest in
how public officials operate. Third, he argued that public officials
have voluntarily stepped into the public eye, and therefore deserve
less protection. Finally, he stated that it is difficult to distinguish a
public issue from a private one.1 69 Another concern is that private
individuals will be afraid to speak out on public issues if they
know that they may then be more easily defamed. Therefore, pub-
lic debate may be discouraged. 17 0
Justice Powell's first argument for rejecting the Rosenbloom
approach was that private individuals are more vulnerable than
169. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974).
170. Id. at 400 (White, J., dissenting).
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public individuals. As Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting
opinion in Gertz, this statement is not always true.' A person's
ability to respond rarely depends on his status as much as it de-
pends on the public interest in a story. If the interest is present, a
"private" individual will have the same chance to respond as
would a public official. If nobody cares about the denials, few will
listen, regardless of whether the person is a public or a private
individual. In Rosenbloom, Justice Brennan suggested that if the
private individual's inability to respond is a problem, the solution
should be in "ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in sti-
fling public discussion of matters of public concern. ' 7 2
Justice Powell also stated that society has a great interest in
how a public official operates. This statement is true;17 3 however,
it is also true that society has an interest in public issues being
debated openly and freely. Is a community's interest in the possi-
bility of having a nuclear plant located nearby less deserving of
open discussion than of how a minor public official did a minor
task? One would think not.
Justice Powell also claimed that public officials are volunta-
rily in the public eye, and therefore are less deserving of defama-
tion protection than private individuals. Yet, perhaps by speaking
out on public issues one also voluntarily enters the public eye.
Even if this argument is not accepted, one still must realize that
all citizens are "public" persons to some degree."7 4 In Gertz, Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out a possible paradox of the Gertz rule in
that it encourages discussion of a public person's private life,
while it discourages discussion of public issues where private indi-
viduals are involved.17 5
Justice Powell further supported his status-oriented approach
by indicating that it is difficult to distinguish a public issue from a
private one. The Supreme Court, however, no longer can use this
excuse for refusing to draw the line in an issue-oriented way. In
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court
held that a state can impose strict liability on a medium where the
statements involve private people.,and matters not of public con-
171. Id. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971).
173. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521.
174. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48.
175. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cern,176 thereby requiring courts to distinguish public issues from
private ones. Although the "public concern" test of Greenmoss
has been defined more narrowly than the "public interest" ap-
proach of Rosenbloom, 7 7 the point here is that a workable issue-
oriented test is possible. Also, the Supreme Court adopted an issue
approach instead of a status approach in allocating the burden of,
proving falsity in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.17 8 If
the distinction can be drawn in Greenmoss and Philadelphia
Newspapers, it can be drawn in other cases as well. Those two
cases indicate that the Court has retreated from its Gertz status-
only approach, and may be willing to acknowledge that Gertz is
wrong, shifting the focus of press protection to the public issue
distinction.
Further, in another area of the law, the Court draws a line
between matters of public interest and matters of private interest.
There are three types of invasion of privacy torts that require such
a distinction: (1) "publicity that unreasonably places the other in
a false light before the public,' 1 79 (2) "unreasonable publicity
given to the other's private life,"' 80 and (3) "unreasonable intru-
sion upon the seclusion of another.""8
The "intrusion upon seclusion" tort consists of an intentional
interference with one's seclusion, either to his person or to his pri--
vate affairs, that would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son. 82 The "false light" tort results when one is placed before the
public in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person by a defendant who acted with actual malice in regard
to the falsity of the representation. 83 The "publicity given to pri-
vate life" tort occurs when one gives publicity to a matter con-
cerning the private life of another, if the matter is not of legiti-
mate concern to the public and the publicity would be highly
176. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
177. See Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders: "Matters of Private
Concern" Give Libel Defendants Lowered First Amendment Protection, 35 CATH. U.L.
REv. 883, 920 (1986); Note, The Evolution of a Public Issue: New York Times Through
Greenmoss, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 773, 78889 (1986).
178. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1560-61, appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1784 (1986).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(d) (1977).
180. Id. § 652A(2)(c).
181. Id. § 652A(2)(a).
182. Id. § 652B.
183. Id. § 652E.
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offensive to a reasonable person.""'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides some guidance
for distinguishing private from public issues:
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities
and some facts about himself that he does not expose to the pub-
lic eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to
his family or to close personal friends. Sexual relations, for ex-
ample, are normally entirely private matters, as are family quar-
rels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses,
most intimate personal letters, most details of a man's life in his
home, and some of his past history that he would rather
forget.185
The Supreme Court has indicated that "events of legitimate
concern to the public" cannot be the basis of an action for inva-
sion of privacy.1 86 Because of its treatment of privacy cases, the
Supreme Court cannot reasonably argue that it is too difficult to
distinguish a public issue from a private one, or that everything
must be a public issue once it is published in a newspaper. In
practice, in the invasion of privacy and defamation cases of Green-
moss and Philadelphia Newspapers, the Supreme Court illus-
trates a belief that the distinction can be made.
The distinction between a public concern and a private con-
cern will only become clearer as more cases create precedent.
"Public concern" does not have to mean "newsworthy." One Su-
preme Court case defines it as "relating to any matter of political,
social or other concern to the community.1 87 This definition,
along with precedent established in various privacy cases, the fair
comment cases, Greenmoss, and Philadelphia Newspapers, cre-
ates a foundation that makes an issue-oriented approach
workable.
Also, the line between public and private figures is not much
clearer than the line between public and private issues.
[In Gertz,] a well known lawyer who had been active for years
in civic affairs and who had written several books and articles
was held not to be a public figure. In Firestone, the subject of a
184. Id. § 652D.
185. Id. § 652D, comment b.
186. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)(state may not im-
pose sanctions on the accurate publication of a rape victim's name obtained from public
records); see also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L. REv. 383, 394-96, 410-15 (1960).
187. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)(discharge of Assistant District
Attorney for distributing questionnaire did not offend first amendment).
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cause celebre divorce suit was likewise placed outside the cate-
gory. Yet earlier, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, a football
coach was held to be a public figure, and in neither Gertz nor
Firestone did the Court explain the difference. 88
If a court can distinguish private figures from public figures, it
can distinguish private issues from public issues.
Another argument against an issue-oriented approach is that
the heightened press protection for public issues provided by a Ro-
senbloom approach will discourage private individuals from en-
gaging in public debate. 89 Yet, when most people speak out on a
public issue, their main concern is usually not the level of proof in
a defamation action. Even if it was a concern to them, having to
prove actual malice would be much more appealing to the speaker
than having no cause of action because a judge labeled a state-
ment "opinion."
Furthermore, if the logic of this argument was extended, it
would require that there should not be a distinction between pub-
lic figures/officials and private figures. The burdens placed on
public officials in libel suits could discourage people from becom-
ing involved in the government for fear of having to prove actual
malice to maintain a libel suit. Also, people may be afraid to
speak out because it would eventually make them public figures.
Whether or not providing protection for the discussion of public
issues will discourage debate, that protection's discouraging effect
is probably not much different from the discouraging effect of pro-
tecting the discussion of public figures.
Having discussed the weaknesses in the arguments against an
issue-oriented approach, arguments for such an approach must be
discussed. An argument in favor of an issue-oriented approach
arises from the fact that public officials have absolute immunity
for statements they make in regard to their office. 9 This protec-
tion results in an immunity for statements made on public issues.
It would be ironic if an official could say anything about a public
issue, while a newspaper or a citizen could be liable for defama-
tion for negligently making the same statement.
Furthermore, the purpose behind freedom of the press is to
encourage debate on public issues.' 9 ' A government deals with
188. Blasi, supra note 173, at 581 (citations omitted).
189. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
190. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959).
191. See supra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
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both public issues and public officials. The Supreme Court must
have thought that actual malice protection was adequate to pre-
vent self-censorship, because that was the protection given to pub-
lic official and public figure discussion. By not providing actual
malice protection for public issues, self-censorship on public issues
will result. To discourage discussion of public issues would be a
grave injustice.
V. APPLYING Rosenbloom TO ELIMINATE THE FACT-OPINION
TESTS
As the law currently stands, a libel plaintiff must always
prove that the statement is defamatory so "as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associ-
ating or dealing with him." 192 This burden is on the plaintiff, re-
gardless of the subject matter or the status of the plaintiff. Also,
where the subject matter is of public concern or the plaintiff is a
public official/figure, the plaintiff must prove the falsity of the
statement.
If the plaintiff is a public official/figure and the statement is
of public concern, thfen the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with actual malice. If the plaintiff is a public official/figure
and the statement is of private concern, proving a lower level of
fault may be adequate, but the Court has not yet dealt with such
a situation.193
Currently, if the plaintiff is a private figure and the statement
is of public concern, then the state may allow the plaintiff to ob-
tain an award of actual damages upon a showing that the defend-
ant was negligent."" This aspect of libel law is the only difference
between the current structure and the proposed structure. The
proposed issue-oriented approach would require actual malice to
be shown for a private figure to win a libel suit on a statement of
public concern. The current structure does require such a plaintiff
to prove actual malice to be awarded punitive damages. The pro-
posed structure, however, would make it more difficult for such a
plaintiff to obtain actual damages and deter the plaintiff from
bringing suit, thereby protecting the media from litigation costs.
The Supreme Court's retreat from an issue-oriented approach
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
193. Note, Constitutional Alternative for Libel Recovery: A Matter Not of Public
Concern, 55 Miss. L.J. 585, 616-17 (1985).
194. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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was short-lived. The Court has basically returned to Rosenbloom,
with two exceptions. First, the Court has fashioned a narrower
and more workable view of what constitutes a public issue.195 This
fine tuning is something that could have been done without over-
ruling Rosenbloom. The second exception is that a statement of
public concern is given less constitutional protection when dealing
with a private figure rather than a public official/figure. 196 The
Court is wrong in not protecting such statements. The protection
of these statements is what the proposed solution attempts to do.
An example will illustrate the value of such statements. Mr.
Bailey, a newspaper reporter in a small town, negligently reports a
story about an epidemic in the town. Mr. Bailey reports that the
epidemic was caused by Mr. Potter on Liberty Street, who does
not mow his lawn, creating a breeding ground for insects that
carry the disease. In reality, the culprit is Mr. Potts, who lives one
block from Mr. Potter.
Mr. Potter, who has lost business as a result of the article,
sues Mr. Bailey for libel. Mr. Bailey's article stated, "Mr. Potter
is a warped, frustrated old man who has caused a number of
deaths in our town through his laziness." The epidemic is un-
doubtedly of public concern. Mr. Potter is a private citizen.
Should the Constitution protect such speech? Put another way, do
we want to encourage newspapers to print stories on matters of
public concern such as that occurring in this situation?
The current structure of constitutional protection would make
Mr. Bailey potentially liable for his negligence. The suggested so-
lution would give the reporter actual malice protection. Under the
current structure, "freedom of the press" gives Mr. Bailey little
protection, encouraging self-censorship on an important issue. In
fact, an article about a dog catcher taking an extra five minutes at
lunch would have more constitutional protection than this article
about a deadly epidemic in the town.
Statements of public concern contribute to our society. One
commentator has noted the increase in the amount of public ser-
vices performed by public contractors. 9 ' This increase is another
reason for an issue-oriented approach - the need to discuss such
contractors who probably would not be held to be public figures,
195. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
197. Note, Ferguson v. Watkins: The Vortex Within Mississippi Defamation Law,
55 Miss L.J. 619, 638 (1985).
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but whose work is of public concern.
As for privileges, the only difference between the current
structure and the proposed solution is that currently there is a
,privilege for opinions. The proposed solution, does not do away
with the opinion privilege, but protects the opinions through other
,press protections without incorporating an unworkable test for de-
termining the meaning of words.
This restructuring of the New York Times protection as a
solution to the fact-opinion problem is very similar to the struc-
ture of the common law privilege of fair comment. "The common
law privilege of 'fair comment' . . . permitted statements of opin-
ion about matters of general public interest to be freely made,
provided they were botl 'reasonable' and based upon facts fairly
stated or known to the recipients of the communications.' ' 8
The proposed solution is structured around matters of public
interest, as is the fair comment privilege. Like the fair comment
privilege, the proposed solution does not protect a statement of
private interest about a private individual. Once it is established
that the statements are of public interest, the proposed solution
requires that a plaintiff prove "actual malice." This requirement is
similar to the fair comment requirement that the statement be
"reasonable" and based upon facts fairly stated or known to the
recipients of the communications.
The proposed solution is broader than the fair comment privi-
lege in that it does not require the statement to be an "opinion" to
receive actual malice protection. However, there were a minority
of jurisdictions that did apply the fair comment privilege to state-
ments of fact.199
The proposed solution's actual malice protection practically
creates an absolute privilege for opinions of public interest. In or-
der to show actual malice, a plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant acted recklessly with regard to the truth or acted with knowl-
edge of the statement's falsity. This burden has been
-acknowledged by the Supreme Court as forcing the plaintiff to
prove that the statement is false. 00 If one believes the statement
198. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2 (1980).
199. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
200. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). The Court
also extended that burden by holding that "at least where a newspaper publishes speech of
public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that
the statements at issue are false." Id. at 768-69.
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in Gertz that "there is no such thing as a false idea, '20 1 then a
plaintiff can never prove an opinion is false, and therefore a plain-
tiff cannot win a defamation suit where an "opinion" is in contro-
versy. One commentator, prior to Philadelphia Newspapers, rec-
ommended eliminating the fact-opinion distinction and placing the
burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff.202 Since Philadelphia
Newspapers has placed that burden on the plaintiff where the
speech is of public concern,203 that commentator would argue that
the fact-opinion distinction can now be eliminated without any al-
terations to the current legal landscape. Such a solution, however,
rests too much upon the assumption that an opinion cannot be
false. This Note proposes that the plaintiff's burden of proving fal-
sity is not enough protection for "opinions" of public concern, and
that actual malice protection for such statements ensures that
even "false opinions" about matters of public concern are pro-
tected as long as the speaker was not reckless in making such
statements.
Furthermore, Robert Sack, a legal scholar in this area, has
stated that after New York Times, "cases involving opinion about
public officials can usually be dealt with under both the common
law and Constitution without making fine distinctions between the
two. '204 Considering the opinion privilege in light of Rosenbloom,
Sack stated that "[s]ince fact and opinion would both have been
covered [under Rosenbloom], distinctions between fact and opin-
ion would have become less important. '20 5 Such claims indicate
that a public issue approach can replace the unworkable fact-opin-
ion tests.
Most of the statements protected by the opinion tests can be
protected without resorting to such tests. The Restatement test,
for the most part, protects statements which are already pro-
tected. If a defendant states all of the nondefamatory true "facts"
an "opinion" is based upon, it would be rare that a court would
find the defendant negligent, and even rarer that the defendant
would be found to have acted with actual malice. If the defend-
ant's "facts" do not support his "opinion," the statement probably
201. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
202. Note, Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determina-
tion: A Critique of Ollman v. Evans, 71 IOWA L. REV. 913, 931 (1986).
203. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
204. R. SACK, supra note 198, at 177.
205. Id. at 177-78. Sack also wrote that "[i]n short, there is no sound, dependable,
logical device for distinguishing statements of fact from statements of opinion." Id. at 156.
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is not defamatory because the audience would not believe the de-
famatory "opinion." If defamatory facts are implied, a cause of
action will exist, with or without the Restatement test. Also, the
verifiability test is unnecessary for determining "opinions" because
if opinions cannot be verified, a plaintiff will never be able to
prove that an opinion is false and a defendant may obtain a sum-
mary judgment.
Further evidence demonstrating that the opinion privilege's
protection is illusory is that a number of courts have discovered
that statements protected as "opinions" can be protected in other
ways. In Ferguson v. Watkins,"' the Mississippi Supreme Court,
after holding that a statement was a privileged opinion, went fur-
ther in protecting the statement on another ground. The court's
method was similar to the solution proposed by this Note. The
court, basing its holding on Gertz, created the status of a "vortex
public figure," defined as one who "becomes thrust into the vortex
of a matter of legitimate public interest" and who "must prove
actual malice when he brings a defamation action arising out of
the matter of legitimate public interest. 20 7 The vortex public fig-
ure approach shifts the focus from the plaintiff to the issue,208 as
does the proposed solution. In Ferguson, the court found the
"opinions" to be protected because the subject matter was of legit-
imate public interest and the plaintiffs failed to prove actual
malice. 09
In Flotech, Inc. v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,210 the
First Circuit Court of Appeals found the fact-opinion distinction
inconclusive as to whether a statement was an opinion, but found
the statement privileged on other grounds.211 In Marchiondo v.
206. 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984)(newspaper article concerning the arrangement
physicians had with county for services in the county hospital emergency room constituted
caustic commentary but was not libelous).
207. Id. at 277-78. Gertz defined one way a person may become a public figure as
when "an individual ...is drawn into a particular public controversy ...." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). The focus in these situations is on the issue
more than the status of the plaintiff. While Gertz claimed to be abandoning an issue-
oriented approach, the Court could not abandon the belief that "freedom of speech" is
really designed to protect statements about issues of public concern, not just statements
about people of public concern. Id. at 344-46.
208. See Note, supra note 197, at 637.
209. Ferguson, 448 So. 2d at 279.
210. 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 777. The court affirmed summary judgment for a supplier of motor oil
that denounced an oil additive used by the plaintiff in a press release. The statement, while
inconclusive as to whether or not it was an opinion, was privileged as a statement made in
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New Mexico State Tribune Co.,21 2 the court held a statement to
be privileged opinion, but noted that the trial court found the
statement to be protected under the common law defense of fair
comment. 13 Further, in holding a restaurant review to be a pro-
tected opinion, the court in Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour
Azur S.A.2 14 noted that such reviews have been held not to be
libelous for various reasons.2"5
As an example of how statements can be protected without
invoking opinion tests, consider an illustration from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts; "A says to B about C, a city official: 'He
and his wife took a trip on city business a month ago and he
added her expenses in as a part of his own.' B responds: 'If he did
that he is really a thief.' "218 The Restatement explains that B's
expression is an opinion that does not imply any defamatory facts,
and B is therefore not liable to C. The same result, however, can
be reached without invoking a fact-opinion test. The statement
may be seen as rhetorical hyperbole, which is not actionable. Fur-
ther, B is probably not even negligent in making such a statement
and therefore he would not be liable to C since actual malice
would be required in such a situation. 17 Often, the existing struc-
ture of defamation law will protect the same statements that the
fact-opinion tests protect. Also, if the "publicness" of a statement
is determined in light of the audience at which it is directed, then
actual malice protection will often be given to such statements.1 ,
The lower courts discuss the valuable contributions of opin-
ions to open debate. Yet, without the fact-opinion tests, most
"opinions" would still be protected. This Note discussed the idea
that false statements of fact can contribute to society as well as
false "opinions." If the Court is really concerned about the value
of the statements, it would increase the protection for statements
of public concern as suggested in this Note. Statements of public
concern, facts or opinions, are what contribute to society; such
business interest or for public protection, and the plaintiff did not show actual malice.
212. 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1981).
213. Id. at 294-95, 648 P.2d at 333.
214. 759 F.2d 219 (1985).
215. Id. at 228.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, illustration 5 (1977).
217. Indeed, two of the five illustrations in this Restatement section are based on
Supreme Court cases that found no liability without the use of the fact-opinion tests:
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) and Old Dominion Branch
No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
218. R. SMOLLA, supra note 138, at 249-50.
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statements need and deserve constitutional protection.219 Opinions
that do not imply defamatory facts will not make a speaker liable,
whether or not an opinion test is used. The opinion tests waste
time and resources by shifting the focus away from the real issue
of a defamation action. This waste is a great evil in the area of
first amendment protection.
CONCLUSION
The proper balance between the concerns of freedom of the
press and the rights of individuals is difficult to maintain. Perhaps
the changing times give us a reason to take a closer look at the
role of the courts in this area. In the early days of journalism,
newspapers were not considered as reliable as they are today.
When a newspaper is seen as dispensing Truth, the goal of dis-
semination of a broad range of information is no longer served.
Allowing a Charles Foster Kane to publish a libelous statement
may aid the free flow of ideas, because readers take it with a grain
of salt and balance it with other "ideas." But when The New
York Times or Dan Rather makes a defamatory statement it is
often seen as gospel, and usually the victim's only possible defense
to the statement is achieved through the courts.220
The concerns of the individual in our society should not be
discarded easily. We have accepted that freedom of speech is
often more important than individual justice, because it benefits
the individuals more in the long run. The protections offered by
the first amendment are of great value. Perhaps it is true "that to
the public good [p]rivate respects must yield.' ' 221 One should re-
member that James Madison said, "[s]ome degree of abuse is in-
separable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is
this more true than in that of the press. '"222 Yet, some degree of
abuse is separable, and it should be separated, especially where it
will also result in a more proper protection of the freedom of the
press. The value of speech to society results from its focus on pub-
lic issues, not whether it can be called an "opinion." A concrete
219. See supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 71.
220. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 138, at 11-13.
221. Milton, Samson Agonistes, in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITER-
ATURE 1563 (1979).
222. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)(quoting James
Madison, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)).
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press protection should replace the illusory protection of the fact-
opinion distinction, which in reality only hinders the goals of
justice.
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER
